Why BRICS aid is better than Western aid
The aid programs BRICS countries (Brazil, India, Russia, China and South Africa) have been growing at a rapid pace especially over the last decade in keeping along with their share in the global economy. At the same time western countries (Europe, US, Canada etc.) faced with recession and downturn post 2008 economic crisis, have failed to increase aid to levels pledged in 2005 OECD Development Cooperation Committee (DAC) conference (Woods N, 2008). It is in this light that the question of whose aid is better acquires even great importance. Will BRICS aid undo the hard won gains of the last 50 years undermining the efforts of western donors to improve governance, human rights record etc. in the developing world? Or will it bring a paradigm shift making the aid industry more equitable, by making it more competitive and shifting power away from the western donors.
Literature on development aid can be roughly divided into two categories: one that focuses on the why nations give aid or the commercial, geopolitical, ideological motivations that drive their respective aid programs (e.g. Mosley, 1985;Raffer & Singer, 1996; Stokke, 1996;); the other that deal with aid effectiveness debate, whether the aid is having the desired effect, is it reaching the people it is intended for, is aid amount being utilised efficiently etc. (e.g. Hellinger, 1988; Arvin, 2002; Pomerantz, 2004). While a lot of the discourse surrounding this topic centres on the aid effectiveness debate (Sato J et al, 2006, Brautigam D, 2009, O’Keefe, 2007) this essay will use post-colonial discourse and gift theory as a framework to analyse BRICS aid and Western aid. It will try to establish the fundamental differences between the two and in so doing work out if one is indeed better than the other and if so how and why.
Before proceeding further certain term used commonly in this essay must be placed it is proper context. Firstly the term “aid” is used in this essay in a broad sense. It is not restricted to DAC definition or “official development assistance” (ODA). Here grants, loans, technical cooperation etc. between donor and recipient delivered with development intent irrespective of percentage of concession or ‘grant’ is considered as aid. This is done so as to include various types of development initiatives used by the BRICS countries that are similar in nature to ODA, in so far as they are subsidised to one level or another by donor country but does not fall within the official DAC definition of ODA. Another term used commonly in this essay is ‘the west’; for the purposes of this essay the west refers 24 original member of DAC before it was expanded to include Japan, South Korea and Eastern European countries but for all intents purposes it refers to former colonial powers namely US and Western European countries as well as Australia and Canada who wield significant economic and political clout globally.
As we start to look at BRICS aid/western aid debate on of the first things that becomes evident is that despite the fact that the amount of aid offered by BRICS countries is relatively small and despite the fact that welcoming of more donors leads to further donor fragmentation which goes against logic of DAC Consensus model, recipient countries seem to be welcoming BRICS aid. A prime example of this would be Cambodia with a donor fragmentation index of .91, one of the highest in the world, seems to be welcoming BRICS aid, not as an ad hoc ‘take everything that comes along’ philosophy but rather as a considered strategy of promoting alternatives to the western aid led development paradigm (Sato J et al, 2006). BRICS aid also seems to enjoy greater acceptance among the leader and general population of recipient countries e.g. in Afghanistan despite having given only a fraction of aid western countries have, 2010 Gallup poll showed that India was the most appreciated visa vie development assistance and general population wants less western involvement and more Indian involvement (The Times of India, 2010). Now these observations point to one thing despite giving significant amount development aid to developing countries there is a deep divide between western countries and the recipients of their aid. This divide and its reasons will become even more apparent further along the analysis as more examples come to light.
The choice post-colonial discourse as framework upon which to base the analysis is not a random one, the fact that most of the large western donors are former colonial nations, bulk of whose aid goes to their former colonies (Chaturvedi, 2008) and Bretton Woods institutions, IMF, World Bank, other development banks which were formed towards the end of the second world still dominate the field of development (Mosse and David, 2005). These institution still reflect the realities of 1944, they are still dominated and effectively controlled by western nations and have undergone little or no reforms despite the efforts of BRICS nations as well as other developing nations. Western nations appoint their own representatives to key positions of these institutions who are in turn take all key decisions and are not accountable to the countries that are affected by those decisions (Woods, 2008).
To understand the ‘aid industry’ as it exists today we must first look at origins of interest of west in the so called third world and analyse the dominant narrative that the west uses describe its donors activities.
The following are excerpts from the websites of aid agencies of Canada (CIDA), US (USAID) and Netherlands (NDCP),
Canadian International Development Agency: ‘We want to help those in need . . . The Canadian aid program reflects values that all Canadians cherish: humanitarianism, social justice, generosity, and peace. Most Canadians believe that helping the less fortunate is the right thing to do’ (CIDA, 2006, cited in Kapoor I 2008: 80).
United States Agency for International Development: ‘The United States has a long history of extending a helping hand to those people overseas struggling to make a better life, recover from a disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country. It is this caring that stands as a hallmark of the United States around the world — and shows the world our true character as a nation’ (USAID, 2006, cited in Kapoor I 2008: 80).
Netherlands Development Cooperation Programme: ‘There is strong public support in the Netherlands for development cooperation. Many people contribute in some way, whether as volunteers or as donors. We take pride in this’ (NDCP, 2006, cited in Kapoor I 2008: 80).
All these three statements have one thing in common. They eulogise the, ‘we’ referring to people of respective nation in mass as being ‘caring’ and enlightened (cherishing all the ‘right’ values) in comparison to the recipient who is poor and under privileged and unable to govern themselves hence in in need to assistance and guidance. NDCP goes even further asking citizens to take pride in its virtues.
However it is interesting to note the current newly published description of USAID explicitly states that the purpose of USAID is furthering of US interests and creating markets and trading partners for US in addition to promoting broad based development. (USAID, 2014). Perhaps pointing to the fact that the domestic support for the ‘altruistic’ aid program is has decreased in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis thus the need to explicitly state that aid is for purposes of furthering US commercial and foreign policy interests.
Keeping the current state of discourse in mind let us ask the question what was the purpose in of projecting this, the fore mentioned projection of people of western countries as moral and with a duty to help the ‘less fortunate’ is reminiscent of the early colonial discourse and race relationships. The early anthropologist like Strong argued that since non-white races were underdeveloped and thus incapable of governing themselves it was the responsibility of the more advanced western white race to take control of the government and take care of them (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). There is significant similarities between colonial era opinions of modern advanced society with a duty to take care of those less advanced or for that matter ‘less fortunate’ bare striking similarity to discourses prevalent in western development aid architecture. Bicum uses Dfid (UK Department for International Development) promotional literature to demonstrate the very same (2005), that be said I looking at the entire western development aid process through post development critique is overkill and too simplistic. Post-development critiques of the current development discourse while important often treats the ‘development industry’ as a homogenous mass which is in effect too simplistic (Baaz 2005). It does not take into the account the effect of individual actors, increasingly multi-cultural nature of western societies brought about by decades of migration. The change USAID’s self-description between 2006 and 2014 shows development industry is constantly changing and evolving and cannot be looked in a static manner.
Now why then is establishing the origins western aid discourse important, simply put it is important because it is in sharp contrast to the origins of the development discourse of BRICS countries. The development discourse of BRICS countries is grounded in the language of South-South cooperation which is in turn based on the principles of the non-aligned movement, widely adopted by at the Bandung conference in 1955, prior to which they were articulated in the Sino-Indian ‘Panchsheel’ principles of 1954 (Large, 2010). While the non-aligned movement faced many issues and splits due to differences between its members, the language of South-South cooperation has stood the test of time. The‘Panchsheel’ or five basic principles on which South-South cooperation is based are, respect for territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Woods, 2008). The development discourse of the BRICS nations hence is not just fancy language intended to mask their commercial and geo-political aspiration that motivate their aid programs. Rather they provide a framework for BRICS countries to engage with other global south countries, and enter into mutually beneficial partnerships on an equitable basis (Strauss, 2009).
This framework predates the BRICS acronym by about 50 years and was meant as a way to rejection colonialism and neo-colonialism as in that sense the narrative that underpins BRICS aid is the polar opposite of the language that underpins that of the west. The Bandung conference where these principles were first saw broad based acceptance took place at a time when many countries in Asia and Africa were still under colonial rule and were in the throes of independence movements. 16 participating nations from Asia and Africa, themselves former colonies, took the opportunity to assert their independence, territorial integrity and right to independence their support for the people of the nation still under occupation, facing discrimination and oppression. The Bandung declaration, that today lies at the bed rock of south-south cooperation, was laid out in stark opposition to the colonial narrative (Tan and Acharya, 2008). Colonial narrative which as we established earlier finds resonance in the contemporary western aid narrative, an aid narrative which is based on moral superiority of the westlegitimised by advanced economic ‘development’ and cultural ‘refinement’.
Now it is only natural that aid regimes borne under such diametrically opposite ideological underpinnings be different. For instance much of the aid given by BRICS countries does not fall within the ambit of official developmental aid (ODA) criteria as defined by DAC. BRICS aid is accused of being mercantilist and western scholars have opined that it will harm the economies of the developing countries in the long term (Naim, 2007). The assessment is not shared by developing countries as we saw in the beginning of the essay as developing seem eager to welcome BRICS aid.
Much of the criticism of the BRICS aid is based on a comparison with western aid architecture, especially with regards good governance initiative, environmental and human rights protection etc. where they are accused of undermining western efforts. Western aid agencies as well as west dominated Bretton woods institutions use aid conditionalities to force recipient government to liberalise economy, enact and enforce human rights regulation etc. (Woods, 2008). Conditionalities thus enforced represent by that constitutes any definition interference in the internal affairs of a nation and thus a violation of its national sovereignty (Stokke, 1995). Now whether such conditions justified, are they for good of the citizens of said nation etc. are difficult to say in wholesale manner and needs examination on a case by case basis. A negative example would be the Structural adjustment programs pushed by the west through conditional aid have been greatly criticised across the world by developing countries, for not only failing to reduce poverty as the west claimed it would but in many cases causing considerable harm to the recipient country’s poverty reduction efforts (Esteves, 2013 as cited in Younis, 2013).
An instance where such an intervention could be excused is for protection of basic human rights using the universal declaration of human rights as a baseline a case can be made for intervention in domestic affairs of country (Stokke, 1995).In reality however the West applies these principles on an inconsistent basis guided more by their geopolitical priorities than a consistent morality or even an international law based approach. Just a week ago US authorised supply attack helicopter to Egypt under military aid program (The Washington times, 2014) mere days after an Egyptian court sentenced 529 people to death in a single trial (Spencer, 2014). More than that west’s own track record with human rights has been patchy at best especially over the last decade (Shane, Johnston and Risen, 2007). Unconditional BRICS aid and their unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of partner nations when looked at in light of such facts take on an entirely different hue and the criticism that BRICS aid undermines the achievements of the West in promoting human rights in recipient countries harder to take seriously.
Thus far the essay has focused on the fundamental philosophies on which BRICS aid and Western aid are based and analysed their impact on how BRICS countries and the West implement their aid programs. The next step in the analysis will focus on the very nature of aid and analyse relationship it forges between donor and recipient. For this purpose the essay will use gift theory, first put forward by Marcel Mosse in his seminal work on the social dynamics of giving, receiving and reciprocating (1955). As the name suggests gift theory analyses nature of gift giving, it proposes that no gifts are free and that all gifts carries with it in an unwritten obligation to reciprocate at later date. Gift theory was further extended by Sahlin to include the concept of ‘negative giving’ whereby the recipient of the gift is unable to reciprocate for an extended period of time thereby fostering a negative relationship with the gift giver (1972). With the gift giver acquiring a position of relative superiority over the receiver thus subverting the dynamics of gift giving which is normatively based competitive game of one-upmanship centered on generosity, deception and self-interest. Derrida in his work ‘Given time’ (1992) proposed that every exercise of gift giving involves an economic aspect, a calculation of value, debt, interest and credit but a ‘true gift’ however must involve no reciprocity and must be completely ‘aneconomic’. He also introduces symbolism into the discourse whereby the act of gift giving is in it an act of acknowledgment, or symbolic recompense, gratitude or expectation of gratitude. In giving, the donor acknowledges himself as a generous, honorable being, someone worthy of recognition, act of narcissistic act self-congratulation. The same applies to the act of receiving. He further asserts that the mere act of acknowledgment of a gift, a thank you can constitute a symbolic recompense thereby eliminating the concept of a non-reciprocal gift.
He also expands definition of the ‘donor’ to include groups, clans, communities or even nations. He writes that,
A gift supposes a subject and a verb, a constituted subject, which can also be
collective — for example, a group, a community, a nation, a clan, a tribe
— in any case, a subject identical to itself and conscious of its
identity, indeed seeking through the gesture of the gift to constitute its
own unity, and precisely, to get its own identity recognized so that the
identity comes back to it, so that it can reappropriate its identity: as its
property. – (Derrida 1992: 10-11)
Self-identification is in this way integral to gift giving, the donor through the act of giving is seeking acknowledgment of his projected self from others. Others in this context include not just the receiver but also other donors and other receivers.
Hattori in his analyses of foreign aid using gift theory says that to understand aid we must look at the social architecture of aid (2001 2003).He further says that the grant element of aid must be looked at as falling within boundaries of Mosse’s definition of gift (1955). When looked at through the lens of gift theory, Hattori notes that the development aid is in essence a ‘negate giving’ as defined by Sahlin (1972). The seemingly one sided economic exchange with the recipient completely lacking the ability to reciprocate fosters a relationship of superiority/inferiority with the donor assuming a superior status. Bourdieu (1977 1990) goes further by exploring the complicity of the recipient in continuing the unequal ‘negative giving’ relationship. The relationship can be called symbolic domination, this then leads to dependency with as the recipient acquiesces to donor’s wishes and is rewarded for the same. The recipient starts to rely more and more on donor aid eventually loosing ability to function without it, losing the ability to raise funds through other means such as taxation and thereby losing ability to act independently. The dependency issue in aid has been subject of a lot of study albeit from different ideological viewpoint (e.g. Easterly 2006; Glennie 2008; Moyo 2009;).
As established earlier in this essay, the aid discourse in the west is based on the notion of benevolent Western people/nations helping the less fortunate in the developing countries whilst asking for nothing in return or in other words ‘gifting’ aid. Kapoor (2008) uses gift theory, postcolonial notions of nationalism and Lacanian psychoanalysis to deconstruct the western narrative of the selfless benevolent benefactor aiding the less fortunate and demonstrates the myriad of ways in which the west benefits from aid giving.
Continuing along with this framework and next step is deconstructing the aid narrative, beginning with the western aid narrative and then contrasting it with that of the BRICS. Derrida (1992) established that donor identity is essential for ‘gift giving’ or in this context aid giving. As was mentioned in the self-descriptions of the development agencies of Canada the predominated description is of the wealthy advanced benevolent west (CIDA, 2006 as cited in Kapoor, 2008). It is interesting to note while most people in the west tend to support foreign aid (Smillie 1999), they tend to know very little about it (CCFR 2002; Lagae 1990). Several surveys done over the years in the west have shown that the general public believes the aid to be up to 25 times higher than its actual levels (CCFR 2002; Jepma 1996: 255; Lagae 1990; Mosley 1985).
Now deconstructing the aid narrative, demonstrates the various ways in which western nations benefit from aid giving.
Tied aid, as stated in the current USAID self-description, US gives aid to further its Commercial, Foreign policy interests and build what they USAID calls ‘goodwill’ (USAID,2014). Tied aid has been a common practise since the 1950s,
“The biggest single misconception about the foreign aid programme is that we send money abroad. We don’t. Foreign aid consists of American equipment, raw materials, expert services, and food” (1968 US State Department document, quoted in Jepma 1991: 47).
In 2001, DAC members agreed to try to move towards untying aid. But as of 2011 69 billion dollars more 50% of global ODA still remains tied, with official statistics under-reporting the fact on ground (Provost, 2011). This statistics however only speaks of economically tied loan. Almost all western aid comes ideologically tied or conditionalities, Loans coming tied with neo-liberal agenda of market reforms and government austerity at the cost of social welfare programs (Esteves, 2013 as cited in Younis, 2013).
A benefit of aid giving that is not often heard of is, the role it pays in constructive a national narrative and sustaining a national identity. In order to understand this phenomenon we must look at the postcolonial theories of nationalism. According to Bhaba, Nationalism is all about constructive single continuous narrative that encompasses all the diverse cultural and social aspects of that nation. This necessity for such a narrative stems from Lacanian psychoanalytic desire for fullness an avoidance of the real or in other words avoidance of ambiguity, incompleteness, emptiness (Kapoor, 2008).
People have a natural drive to situate themselves as a part of a community (Anderson, 1983), to seek a sense of belonging, of acceptance, and larger existence by affiliating with the nation. The nation no matter how coherent the narrative is ultimately a fictitious entity, but with a mythology so compelling that people reflexively supress unpleasant memories associated with nation-building (colonialism, poverty, crime, discrimination etc.) are pushed to corner. Instead, people take pride and gain confidence from their national symbols flags, monuments, heroes. Self-identification however is always achieved in contrast to the ‘other’. An antagonist to the national identity, the protagonist, the other must be identified, isolated or even denigrated in order to the raise the nation by comparison (Bhabha, 1990; Chatterjee, 1986)
Role of aid in creating a national narrative is equally important, the image of donor kindness, in fact, is integral to the production of the nation. Being acknowledged as benevolent and caring through the aid programme enables the nation to build an identity centred on the positive values providing the populace with a statics and narratives in which they can take pride, and in so doing become acknowledged if not unique. It also positions the ‘Other’, the recipient as inferior, less developed, less capable.
As has just been demonstrated, in this essay, aid often projected as a benevolent gift is in reality a a deception or ‘grift’ as Kapoor (2008) puts it. Now it is in comparison to this western narrative of ‘aid’ that we look as the BRICS development paradigm. BRICS nations and those of the global south in general avoid the term donor because of its paternalistic, hegemonic and neo-colonial overtones, instead preferring the term development partner (Mawdsley, 2012). South-South development cooperation
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